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Several works in the shopping-time and in the human-capital lit-
erature, due to the nonconcavity of the underlying Hamiltonian, use
￿rst-order conditions in dynamic optimization to characterize neces-
sity, but not su¢ ciency, in intertemporal problems. In this work I
choose one paper in each one of these two areas and show that opti-
mality can be characterized by means of a simple aplication of Arrow￿ s
(1968) su¢ ciency theorem.
1 Introduction
Several works in the economic literature, particularly in the shopping-time1
(e.g., Lucas (2000), Gillman, Siklos and Silver (1997), Cysne (2003), Cysne,
Monteiro and Maldonado (2004))2 and in the human-capital literature (e.g.
Uzawa (1965), Lucas (1988 and 1990), Chari, Jones and Manuelli (1995),
￿I am thnkful for comments of participants in workshops at the University of Chicago
and at the Graduate School of Economics of the Getulio Vargas Foundation (EPGE/FGV).
yKey Words: Arrow￿ s Su¢ ciency Theorem, Optimal Control, Shopping-Time, Human
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1As pointed out by Lucas (2000), nonconvexities in the shopping-time literature are
related to the ￿xed costs of converting interest-bearing assets into cash (the costs of going
to the bank in Baumol￿ s (1952) analysis).
2See equation 5.3 in Lucas (2000), equation (10) in Cysne, Maldonado and Monteiro
(2004) and the terms Ac and (1 ￿ A)c in the Hamiltonian of Section 2 in Gillman et al.
(1997).
1Ladron-de-Guevara et al. (1999) and Kosempel (2001))3 use ￿rst-order con-
ditions in dynamic optimization to characterize necessity, but not su¢ ciency,
in intertemporal problems. The reason, always either implicitly or explic-
itly recognized by the authors, is that the non-concavity of the associated
Hamiltonian does not allow for the use of Mangasarian￿ s (1966) well known
su¢ cient conditions in optimum control.
Mangasarian￿ s theorem states that if the Hamiltonian is (strictly) concave
with respect to the control and the state variables, then the ￿rst-order con-
ditions are also su¢ cient for an interior (unique) optimum. The papers cited
above are some examples in the economic literature in which such conditions
are not obeyed.
Arrow￿ s (1968) theorem, though, generalizes Mangasarian￿ s result, and,
as we shall see, is able to generate su¢ ciency in some cases in which Man-
gasarian￿ s result is not directly applicable. Arrow￿ s theorem requires another
type of concavity. In words4, ￿rst, the Hamiltonian is maximized with re-
spect to the control variables, for a given value of the costate variables. The
optimum values of the control variables, as a function of the state variables
and of the costate variable, are then substituted into the Hamiltonian. Call
this new function (of the state and costate variables) the maximized Hamil-
tonian. Arrow￿ s main result is that if this maximized Hamiltonian is (strictly)
concave with respect to the state variable, for the given value of the costate
functions, then the ￿rst order conditions characterize a (unique, concerning
the state variable) optimum5.
Of course, if the Hamiltonian is concave with respect to both the state and
control variables, then the maximized (with respect to the control variables)
Hamiltonian will be concave in the state variables. But the reverse is not
true. This is the reason why one says that Arrow￿ s theorem generalizes the
Mangasarian￿ s su¢ cient conditions.
The main purpose of this article is calling the attention to the fact, and
exemplifying how, in some speci￿c cases, an application of Arrow￿ s theorem
can yield returns at very reasonable costs in terms of the required algebrisms.
As a by-product of the analysis, a complementary insight into some papers of
the shopping-time and human-capital literature (the ones used as examples)
is also delivered.
3See equation (15) in Uzawa, equation (13) in Lucas (1988), equation (2.3) in Lucas
(1990), equation (5) in Chari, Jones and Manuelli (1995), equation (2.4) in Ladron-de-
Guevara et al. (1999) and equation (6) in Kosempel (2001, 2004).
4A formal version of Arrow￿ s theorem is presented in the next section.
5It is assumed that the argument applies (Lebesgue) almost-everywhere regarding the
time domain in which such functions are considered, and in an open and convex neighbor-
hood (considering the state variable) of the candidate (s) for optimum.
2Regarding the shopping-time literature, I concentrate the main analysis
Cysne (2003). A solution to the problem of non-covexity found in Lucas
(2000, section 5) follows the same general lines as those detailed here and is
provided as a speci￿c comment to that paper in Cysne (2004).
As it concerns the human-capital literature, I focus the analysis on Lucas
(1988). The reason for concentrating on this paper is that its technology for
accumulating human capital (equation (13) in Lucas (1988)) has been used
by many other authors in the literature. This technology has actually been
used before Lucas by Uzawa (1965)6. But it happens that Uzawa￿ s results
can be obtained as a special case of Lucas￿ s modelling, when the utility is
linear in consumption and there is not externality in production.
In the remaining of the paper, section 2 presents a formal version of
Arrow￿ s theorem. In section 3 I exemplify the use and usefulness of the
theorem within the shopping-time literature and, in section 4, within the
human-capital literature. Section 5 concludes.
2 Arrow￿ s Theorem
Following Seierstad and Sydsater￿ s (1987, p. 107 and page 236), Arrow￿ s
theorem, adapted to an in￿nite horizon, reads as follows7:
Theorem 1 (Arrow￿ s Su¢ ciency Theorem): Let (￿ x(t); ￿ u(t)) (both contin-
uously di⁄erentiable) be a pair that satis￿es the conditions (2) and (3) below,
in the problem of ￿nding a piecewise-continuous control vector u(t) and an
associated continuously-di⁄erentiable state vector variable x(t); with x(t) be-
longing to a given open and convex set A 2 Rn for each t ￿ t0; de￿ned on




subject to the di⁄erential equations:
_ xi(t) = fi(x(t);u(t);t); i = 1;2;:::;n (2)
6As well as by Rosen (1967), but in another context.
7Seidseter and Sydersat (1977) argue (p. 370) that the ￿rst published demonstration
of this theorem, which was presented in Arrow and Kurz (1970), is not satisfactory, and
that a correct proof did not seem to be available in the literature till the publication of
their work. This theorem was ￿rst mentioned in Arrow (1968).





i , i = 1;2;:::;n (3)
xi(1) free; i = 1;:::;n
u(t) 2 U ￿ R
r:
Suppose, in addition, that ￿ x(t) belongs to (the open and convex set) A for all
t ￿ t0 and that, given the Hamiltonian function:




there exists a piecewise continuously-di⁄erentiable function p(t) = (p1(t);:::;pn(t))
de￿ned on [t0;1] such that H(￿ x(t); ￿ u(t);p(t);t) exists and the following con-
ditions are satis￿ed:
H(￿ x(t); ￿ u(t);p(t);t) ￿ H(￿ x(t);u(t);p(t);t); for all u 2 U, t 2 [t0;1] (4)
_ pi(t) = ￿Hxi(￿ x(t); ￿ u(t);p(t);t); i = 1;:::;n (5)
lim
t!1pi(xi(t) ￿ ￿ xi(t)) = 0 i = 1;:::;n (6)
H￿(x;p(t);t) = max
u2U
H(x;u;p;t) exists and is a concave function of x for all
t ￿ t0; then, (￿ x(t); ￿ u(t)) solves problem (1)-(3) above.
3 An Application in a Shopping-Time Model
In this section I apply Arrow￿ s theorem to Cysne (2003).
Cysne (2003) considers an economy with n di⁄erent assets performing
monetary functions. Bonds (B) is the (n + 1)th asset. Bonds are used
only as a store of value and pay the (endogenously determined) benchmark
interest rate r: The monetary assets are represented by the n￿dimensional
vector X = (X1;X2;:::;Xn); and their real quantities by the vector x =
(X1=P;X2=P;:::;Xn=P); P the price level: The real value of the sotck of
bonds is b = B=P: Each asset x1;x2;:::;xn pays an interest rate r1;r2;:::;rn.
Relatively to the benchmark rate, paid by bonds, the vector of opportunity
costs reads u = (u1;u2;:::;un) = (r ￿ r1;r ￿ r2;:::;r ￿ rn):
With g > 0 denoting a discount factor and c consumption, households





4The potential product (that available when the shopping time (s) is equal
to zero) y is normalized to one. The household is endowed with one unit of
time so that y + s = 1: Make rR = (r1 ￿ ￿;r2 ￿ ￿;:::;rn ￿ ￿) and denote by
￿ and h, respectively, the rate of in￿ ation and the lump-sum transfers from





_ xi = 1 ￿ (c + s) ￿ h + (r ￿ ￿) b + hrR;xi (8)
and the transacting-technology constraint:
c = G(x)s (9)
The monetary aggregator function G(x) is di⁄erentiable, increasing in each
one of the x variables, ￿rst degree homogeneous, and concave in x.
As in Lucas (2000), the utility function is assumed to be given by:
U(c) = c
1￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿); ￿ 6= 1;￿ > 0 (10)
U(c) = lnc ( case ￿ = 1)
Below, we shall call ￿ the coe¢ cient relative risk aversion8.






In order to apply Arrow￿ s theorem, consider s as the only control variable,
and b and x as the state variables9. The above Hamiltonian clearly is not
concave in these variables because of the term (G(x)+1)s: The maximization









8Since there is no uncertainty in the model, ￿ should actually be called "the inverse of
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution".
9Working with a = b +
Pn
j=1 xj as the only state variable (and s; and the xj￿ s as
control variables) leads to the same ￿rst-order conditions as when one formulates the
problem regarding only s as a control variable and the xj￿ s and b as state variables. Such
￿rst-order conditions obey ￿_ ￿(t) + g￿(t) = Hxj and ￿_ ￿(t) + g￿(t) = Hb which is the
property required from the state variables in the application of the theorem.










(1￿￿)=￿ + ￿(1 ￿ h + (r ￿ ￿)b +
n X
j=1





+ ￿(1 ￿ 1=￿ ￿ h ￿ (r ￿ ￿)b +
n X
j=1
(rj ￿ ￿)xj)); (￿ = 1)
The next step in the application of the theorem is showing that the max-
imized Hamiltonian is concave with respect to the state variables x and b:
Since the term in b is linear, the only variables we have to care about are
those in the vector x: More precisely, those which are not in the linear term Pn
j=1(rj ￿￿)xj: The Hamiltonian is trivially concave in the case ￿ = 1 since
G(x) is concave and increasing in x and, given ￿ (￿ =
U0(G(x)s)G(x)
1+G(x) ￿ 0);
and taking G(x) as a variable, log
G(x)
￿(1+G(x)) is a composite function of two




￿(1+G(x)))(1￿￿)=￿ in the maximized Hamiltonian is concave in x (by the






The extension of this reasoning to Cysne, Monteiro and Maldonado (2004) is
straightfoward. The intuition10 for this result is presented in Figures 1 and
2 below.
(Please Insert Figures 1 and 2 here)
Figure 1 presents the case in which the coe¢ cient of risk aversion is high
enough. The feasible region of maximization is determined by the level curve
of the term multiplying ￿ in (11). Even though this equation (through it￿ s
isoquant) determines a non-convex feasible region in the (G(x);s) plane (the
shadowed region in the ￿gures), if the curvature of the utility function is high
enough the non-convexity poses no problem.
Figure 2 presents the problematic case, in which the ￿rst-order conditions
(with equality) fail to characterize the optimum. This happens when the
coe¢ cient of risk aversion ￿ is not high enough.
10Note that condition (13) makes U(G(x)s) strictly concave in both G (by these means,
also in x) and s in the original problem, but not the original Hamiltonian (11). Therefore,
Mangasarian￿ s (1966) su¢ cient conditions cannot be used in this case as well.
64 An Application in a Human-Capital Model
In this section I will repeat the procedure of the last section, taking one
paper in the human-capital literature and showing how it can bene￿t from
the application of Arrow￿ s theorem. For the reasons detailed in section 1,
Lucas (1988) is a natural choice. In this paper preferences over consumption








1￿￿ ￿ 1); ￿ > 0
and human capital (h) accumulates according to:
_ h = h(1 ￿ u)
Above, c (per-capita consumption) and u (the fraction of non-leisure time
devoted to production) are control variables in the optimum path chosen by
the representative consumer. N is the total number of workers and uNh is
the e⁄ective workforce used in the production of the consumption good.
With K standing for the level of physical capital, the technology of goods
production is:
Nc + _ K = AK
￿(uNh)
1￿￿h
￿; A > 0; 0<￿ < 1; ￿ ￿ 0 (14)
The last term in the second member of equation (14), h￿; stands for the
externality of the level of human capital in the production of the consumption
good. In the problem solved by the representative consumer (as opposed to
that solved by a social planner), this term is taken as given.













+￿2 [￿h(1 ￿ u)]
￿1 and ￿2 are multiplier functions that give the marginal value of the state
variables K and h, respectively, discounted back to time zero. Both ￿1 and
￿2; therefore, are nonnegative.
This Hamiltonian is clearly nonconcave in the control and state variables
due to the term h(1 ￿ u): Denoting by Hx the derivative of H with respect









It also follows form the above equations that Hcc = 0 < 0; Huu < 0
and Huc = 0: Therefore, the Hamiltonian is strictly concave in (c;u): The
unique optimum values of these control variables can be found by making














Substitute (16) and (17) in (15). The optimized (with respect to the
































Since ￿ ￿ 0; the optimized Hamiltonian is concave in the state variable
K and h (though not strictly concave) only for ￿ = 0:
We conclude that, when there is no externality in the production of the
consumption good due to the human-capital accumulation, the ￿rst-order
conditions derived in the problem do represent a (not-necessarily-unique)
optimum. Note that having ￿ > 0 is not so important in the theory de-
veloped by Lucas (1988), since it predicts sustained growth whether or not
the external e⁄ect is present. The case ￿ = 0 (with ￿ = 1; linear utility)
corresponds to Lucas￿ s version of Uzawa￿ s (1965) paper.
The case ￿ > 0 is not covered by Arrow￿ s theorem. Characterizing the
optimum in this case requires other techniques.
5 Conclusion
In this work I have chosen two papers, respectively, in the shopping-time and
in the human-capital literature, in which the usual Mangasarian￿ s su¢ ciency
conditions for optimality in dynamic programming are not met. In such cases,
Pontryagin￿ s (1962) Maximum Principle cannot tell us if a point satisfying
the ￿rst-order conditions represents an optimum or not. Next, I have shown,
in each case, that optimality can be characterized by means of a simple
aplication of Arrow￿ s (1968) su¢ ciency theorem.
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Figure 2: Problematic Case - Coe¢ cient of Risk Aversion Not High Enough
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